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HOW TO MAKE A PATENT MARKET
Mark A. Lemley*
Nathan Myhrvold**
Imagine a stock market in which buyers and sellers couldn't find
out the prices at which anyone else sold a share of stock. If you wanted
to buy (or sell) a share of stock, you would have to guess what it was
worth. The result, everyone would agree, would be massively inefficient.
Willing buyers and sellers would often miss each other. The price at
which a sale did close would vary widely from sale to sale. And those
who had a source of private or inside information would be able to
exploit others. Some trades might occur in such a system, but surely not
anything like the volume in today's stock markets. Surely no one would
intentionally design a system in which trades had to be "blind" in this
way.
Patents, however, exist in just such a blind market. Want to know if
you are getting a good deal on a patent license or technology
acquisition? Too bad. Even if that patent or ones like it have been
licensed dozens of times before, the terms of those licenses, including
the price itself, will almost invariably be confidential. Patent owners
who want to put their rights up for sale face the same problem.
The result? Willing licensors and licensees can't find each other.
Patent auctions often fizzle, because without a thick market-one with
an array of buyers and sellers bidding on price-no one can know
whether they are getting a steal or being had. When parties do license
patents, the prices are (to the extent we can tell) all over the map. And
the rest of the world has no idea what those prices are. This, in turn,
means that courts lack adequate benchmarks to determine a "reasonable
royalty" when companies infringe patents. The lack of a real, rational
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market for patent licenses encourages companies to ignore patent rights
altogether, because they cannot make any reasonable forecast of what it
would cost them to obtain the licenses they need and because they fear
that they will pay too much for a technology their competitors ignore or
get on the cheap. At the same time, ignorance of prices permits
unscrupulous patent owners to "hold up" companies that make products
by demanding a high royalty from a jury that has no way of knowing
what the patent is actually worth.
The solution is straightforward-require publication of patent
assignment and license terms. Doing so will not magically make the
market for patents work like a stock exchange; there will still be
significant uncertainty about whether a patent is valid and what it covers,
particularly since patents tend by their nature to be unique goods. But it
will permit the aggregate record of what companies pay for rights to
signal what particular patents are worth and how strong they are, just as
derivative financial instruments allow markets to evaluate and price
other forms of risk. It will help rationalize patent transactions, turning
them from secret, one-off negotiations into a real, working market for
patents. And by making it clear to courts and the world at large what the
normal price is for patent rights, it will make it that much harder for a
few unscrupulous patent owners to hold up legitimate innovators, and
for established companies to systematically infringe the rights of others.
"Impossible!," patent lawyers are likely to splutter. "No one would
license patents if they knew they had to disclose their licenses to the
world." But that objection wrongly assumes that the way patent owners
have always done something is the only possible way it can be done. The
recent publication of data on home sales prices has helped, not hurt, the
real estate market. It should do the same for patents. Patent owners have
a product to sell-legal rights to a new technology. If they can find a
willing buyer, both sides will have a strong incentive to enter into the
transaction even if their deal will be disclosed. And since publication
would be required for everyone, having to publish licenses would not
disadvantage either side relative to their competitors. Indeed, the law
already requires patent owners to disclose their license terms in a few
circumstances-where pharmaceutical companies settle with a generic
competitor, or where the transaction is large enough that it is material to
the bottom line of a publicly-traded company-and those disclosure
requirements have not prevented parties from transacting. If Congress
were still concerned about the risks of too much disclosure, it could take
incremental steps towards greater transparency by requiring parties to
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patent lawsuits to disclose their settlements, or publicly-traded
companies to disclose all their licenses.
The only people who stand to lose from mandatory disclosure of
licenses are those who are taking advantage of the current state of
ignorance, whether by holding up defendants or by refusing to pay for
technology that everyone else is paying for. But just as we wouldn't
prevent the development of a new financial instrument just to protect the
interest of an insider trading on their knowledge, we should not use
claims of secrecy to prevent the development of a robust market in
technology.
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